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Although the theft crimes in Nevada are covered in multiple subsections
of the Nevada Revised Statutes (“NRS”), which would make them appear to
comprise separate and distinct crimes, theft in Nevada, and in those states that
have similarly consolidated the theft crimes, is considered one crime.1  Consol-
idation should lead to simplification, which is generally true within those states
that have consolidated the common law theft crimes into one theft statute.2
However, the opposite result rings true in Nevada:  Nevada’s Consolidated
Theft Statute has led to needless confusion rather than simplification because
the common law, codified theft crimes that it was meant to replace still, surpris-
ingly and mystifyingly, remain.
Nevada’s theft statute, more particularly described as the Comprehensive
Theft Statute3 (“CTS” and/or “Theft Statute(s)”), is found in NRS 205.0833.4
* J.D. Candidate, 2008, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas;
B.A., University of Nevada, Las Vegas, 2002.  The author would like to thank Professor
Katherine Kruse for suggesting the topic of this Note.  The author also wishes to thank
Ronald L. Warren, Esq., for his guidance, insight, suggestions, and overall support
throughout the researching and writing of this Note.  Last but most certainly not least, the
author would like to thank her father, Jerry Moore, and grandmother, Rhoda Moore, for their
love and support throughout both law school and life:  I love you.  This Note is dedicated to
the loving memory of my mother, Ramona Moore:  I love and miss you (Oct. 12, 1956 –
Nov. 1, 2000).
1 E.g., State v. Winter, 706 P.2d 1228, 1231 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (Theft in Arizona, as an
effect of the consolidation of the theft offenses, “is presently a single offense even though it
has multiple subsections.”); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.1 cmt. 2, at 137-38 (Official
Draft and Revised Comments 1980) (stating that consolidation of the common law theft
crimes is to consolidate them into a single offense, albeit with some constitutional considera-
tions regarding a defendant’s having fair notice of the crime with which he is charged).
2 See infra note 11 (listing those states that have Comprehensive Theft Statutes).
3 Comprehensive Theft Statutes are also known as either Unified or Consolidated Theft
Statutes, depending on the particular state’s preference in terminology; Nevada’s is known
as Comprehensive.  Assemb. 594, 1989 Leg., 65th Sess. (Nev. 1989) (“Assembly Bill 594
adopts a comprehensive theft statute.”) (emphasis added)).
4 NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.0833 (2007).  Please take note that during the 2007 legislative
session, the Nevada Legislature added to the codified theft laws one additional section,
which adds “organized retail theft rings” to the definition of “theft.” See April 2, 2007
Minutes: Hearing on Assemb. B. 421 Before the Assemb. Comm. on Judiciary, 2007 Leg.,
74th Sess. 7 (Nev. 2007) (“Assembly Bill 421:  [e]stablishes the crime of participating in an
organized retail theft ring.”).
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It provides in relevant part:  “Conduct denominated theft in NRS 205.0821 to
205.0835, inclusive, and section 1 of this act constitutes a single offense
embracing the separate offenses commonly known as larceny, receiving or pos-
sessing stolen property, embezzlement, obtaining property by false pretenses,
issuing a check without sufficient money or credit, and other similar offenses.”5
These words seem simple enough, or at least they were intended to be that
way.  Who would have thought that this “simple” language comprising a “sim-
plification” statute with the very purpose of simplifying the law regarding theft
crimes would create such needless confusion?  This is exactly the result in
Nevada—one the Nevada Legislature itself has created and continues to
perpetuate.
Unfortunately, Nevada’s CTS has led to needless and troubling confusion.
Although the main purpose behind enacting a CTS is to simplify the state of the
law by eliminating the technical and procedural distinctions between various
types of theft and instead to deal with all forms in one simplified statute, the
result in Nevada6 is increased confusion.7  Thus, the Nevada Legislature’s pur-
pose for enacting the statute is not being fully realized because prosecutors are
continuing to charge defendants under either the CTS or the various common
law theft statutes, depending on the facts and circumstances of a particular
case.8  Given the resulting confusion, it is an enigma why the Nevada Legisla-
ture chose to enact a CTS, yet decided not to repeal the very crimes that led to
the drafting and enactment of the statute in the first place.
5 NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.0833(1); see also Winter, 706 P.2d at 1231 (“[T]he multiple prior
theft offenses of embezzlement, conversion, larceny, finding and keeping stolen property,
theft by false pretenses, and other similar ‘verbal distinctions’ [have been consolidated] to
produce a single unified offense.”).
6 It should be noted that California has also arguably kept the codified common law crimes
despite its enactment of a CTS. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 484, 490(a) (West 2007); see CAL.
PENAL CODE §§ 484-502.9, 503-515, 528-539 (codifying larceny, embezzlement, and false
pretenses, respectively).  The term “arguably” is due to CAL. PENAL CODE § 490(a), which
provides:  “Wherever any law or statute of this state refers to or mentions larceny, embezzle-
ment, or stealing, said law or statute shall hereafter be read and interpreted as if the word
‘theft’ were substituted therefor.”  Although this specifically states that these common law
theft crimes are now known as “theft,” California’s theft laws are also confusing because,
technically, the common law theft crimes are still codified, considering that the words “lar-
ceny” and “embezzlement” have not been deleted from the language in the other chapters of
the theft statutes (again, “larceny” and “embezzlement” appear in chapters other than Cali-
fornia’s Theft Statute).
Thankfully, however, California’s theft laws are easier to understand than Nevada’s in
light of section 490(a), whereas Nevada’s theft laws are more confusing because Nevada has
no such section stating that the common law theft crimes of “larceny” and “embezzlement”
appearing in other sections of the statutes are replaced by the term “theft.”
However, because this Note specifically addresses Nevada’s CTS, there will be no fur-
ther discussion regarding California’s Theft Statute.
7 See April 25, 1989 Minutes: Hearing on Assemb. B. 594 Before the Assemb. Comm. on
Judiciary, 1989 Leg., 65th Sess. 4 (Nev. 1989) [hereinafter Assemb. Comm. Hearing] (testi-
mony of Carolyn Ellsworth, Chief Deputy District Attorney for Clark County). See gener-
ally State v. Tramble, 695 P.2d 737 (Ariz. 1985); MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.1 cmt. 2(b), at
133 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980).
8 See E-mail Interview with Dave Barker, Dist. Attorney, Clark County, Nev., in Las Vegas,
Nev. (Nov. 7, 2006) (on file with author).
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In Part II of this Note, the history of NRS 205.0833, Nevada’s CTS, and
the rationales behind Theft Statutes will be addressed.  Then, this Part will spe-
cifically address Arizona’s CTS9 because the language of Nevada’s CTS was
derived from that in Arizona.10  In Part III, this Note will attempt to ascertain
the true reason behind the Nevada Legislature’s failure to repeal the common
law theft crimes in light of the enactment of the CTS because the apparent
reasons behind the CTS fail to address the repeal issue.  The author of this Note
interviewed Clark County, Nevada, District Attorneys Dave Barker, Christo-
pher Laurent, Ben Graham, and former Clark County, Nevada, District Attor-
ney Carolyn Ellsworth to get their perspectives on the state of Nevada’s theft
laws.
Further, in Part III, the doctrine of implied repeal will be addressed, which
is a doctrine that may serve to repeal the common law theft crimes in the
absence of the Nevada Legislature’s direct repeal of the common law theft
crimes.  Finally in Part III, this Note will provide some plausible solutions to
the problem of the muddled mess that has resulted from the Nevada Legisla-
ture’s failure to take this unnecessary, and easily preventable, confusion of the
theft-related crimes seriously.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF COMMON LAW THEFT CRIMES
Practically every state has consolidated all of the common law theft crimes
into one unified crime known simply as “theft.”11  These states essentially fol-
9 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1802 (2007).
10 June 13, 1989 Minutes: Hearing on Assemb. B. 594 Before the S. Comm. on Judiciary,
1989 Leg., 65th Sess. 3 (Nev. 1989) [hereinafter S. Comm. Hearing] (testimony of Dave
Barker, District Attorney for Clark County).  Thus, this Note will not dovetail into a full-
length discussion of the Comprehensive Theft Statutes of all of the states that have them
because it is unnecessary to do so in order to determine the reasons as to why the Nevada
Legislature has refused to address the issue of repealing the theft-related common law
crimes.
11 See ALA. CODE §§ 13A-8-1 to -23 (2007); ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.46.100 to .295 (2007);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1801 to -1818; ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-36-101 to -405 (2007);
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 484, 490(a); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-4-401 to -416 (2007); CONN.
GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-118 to -125b (2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 840-859 (2007); FLA.
STAT. §§ 812.005 to .176 (2007); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-8-1 to -86 (2007); HAW. REV. STAT.
§§ 708-830 to -858 (2007); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 5/16-1 to 5/16A-10 (2007); IND. CODE
§§ 35-43-4-1 to -6 (2007); IOWA CODE §§ 714.1 to .25 (2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-3701
to -3704 (2007); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 514.010 to .150 (West 2007); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14:67 (2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 351-361 (2007); MD. CODE ANN.,
CRIM. LAW §§ 7-102 to -110 (West 2007); MINN. STAT. §§ 609.52 to .551 (2007); MO. REV.
STAT. §§ 570.010 to .220 (2007); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-6-301 to -319 (2007); NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 28-510 to -518 (2007); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 205.0821 to .0835 (2007); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 637:1 to :11 (2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:20-1 to -37 (West 2007); N.Y.
PENAL LAW §§ 155.00 to .45 (McKinney 2007); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-23-01 to -14
(2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2913.01 to .82 (West 2007); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 164.005
to .140 (2007); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3901-3934 (2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-30A-
1 to -44 (2007); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 31.01 to .16 (Vernon 2007); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 76-6-401 to -412 (2007); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.56.010 to .360 (2007); WIS. STAT.
§§ 943.20 to .74 (2007); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-3-401 to -410 (2007).
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lowed the Model Penal Code model for consolidating all of the theft crimes.12
To understand why Theft Statutes came into fruition, it is vital to discuss the
separate common law theft crimes that led to their creation and widespread
adoption.13  Most Theft Statutes define “theft” to comprise the three common
law crimes of larceny, embezzlement, and obtaining property by false
pretenses.14
A. Common Law Theft Crimes and Their Distinctions
“Larceny” is defined as “the wrongful or fraudulent taking and carrying
away of another’s property without his or her permission or consent, with the
intent to deprive the owner of that property permanently.”15  For larceny to
exist, there must be an actual or constructive taking of goods or property, a
carrying away of the goods or property (asportation), a felonious intent, the
goods or property must belong to another, and the taking of the goods or prop-
erty must be without the owner’s consent.16
The generic term “larceny” comprises many different types of larceny,
including grand larceny,17 petit larceny,18 larceny from the person,19 larceny of
12 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 8.8(d), at
415 (1986) (“The Model Penal Code provides for an ambitious plan of consolidation of
smaller separate crimes into one larger crime called ‘theft.’  Theft in the Code covers not
only larceny, embezzlement and false pretenses, but also receiving stolen property and
blackmail or extortion. . . .  Many states follow essentially this approach.”).
13 Note that the history behind the common law theft crimes is more extensive than the brief
summary provided in this Note.  Those articles that have more thoroughly discussed the
common law theft crimes did so because the authors of those articles were arguing for the
adoption of a Comprehensive Theft Statute in their respective states.  In other words, they
were discussing the merits behind the adoption of a Comprehensive Theft Statute by point-
ing out the innumerable flaws with the common law theft crimes.  Considering that Nevada
already has a Comprehensive Theft Statute, the author deems it unnecessary to engage in any
further historical discussion beyond what is already provided herein.
For a more extensive history on the common law theft crimes, see generally John Wes-
ley Bartram, Note, Pleading for Theft Consolidation in Virginia:  Larceny, Embezzlement,
False Pretenses and § 19.2-284, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 249, 250 (1999); John G.
Douglass, Rethinking Theft Crimes in Virginia, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 13, 16 (2003); Rudy J.
Gerber & John F. Foreman, Commentary, Arizona’s Criminal Law:  The Critical Need for
Comprehensive Revision, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 63, 98 (1976); Lee Hargrave, Theft in the Louisi-
ana Criminal Code of 1942, 52 LA. L. REV. 1109 (1992); Donald L. Paillette, The Oregon
Theft Laws:  Consolidation v. Conglomeration, 51 OR. L. REV. 525, 535 (1972); Hugh Peter-
son, Jr., Georgia Law of Theft, 12 MERCER L. REV. 308, 308 (1961); Austin W. Scott, Jr.,
Larceny, Embezzlement and False Pretenses in Colorado—A Need For Consolidation, 23
ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 446 (1951).
14 Paillette, supra note 13, at 525 (“Traditionally, the intentional misappropriation of prop-
erty has been punishable as either larceny, embezzlement, or obtaining by false pretenses.”);
Scott, supra note 13, at 447 (“The fact that today the wrongful appropriation of property is
covered by three related crimes—larceny, embezzlement and false pretenses—is the product
of the legal history of England.”).
15 52B C.J.S. Larceny § 1 (2003).
16 Id.
17 Grand larceny is codified at NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.220 (2007).
18 Petit larceny is codified at NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.240.
19 According to District Attorney Christopher Laurent, in Nevada, larceny from the person
is not included in the Comprehensive Theft Statute as part of common law larceny because it
is considered a more serious offense.  Telephone Interview with Christopher Laurent, Dist.
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an automobile,20 and larceny of a horse.21  The element that determines the
type of larceny of which a defendant is guilty is the punishment inflicted.22
Larceny is further broken down into “simple” or “aggravated” larceny.23  “Sim-
ple” larceny simply involves the taking of property, whereas “aggravated” lar-
ceny additionally involves an invasion of the right of personal security, such as
stealing from the person or stealing from the home.24  Additionally, some states
have broadened larceny to encompass the crimes of embezzlement and false
pretenses, all three of which have been consolidated in most states under Com-
prehensive Theft Statutes as constituting simply the crime of “theft.”25
The distinction between the crimes of embezzlement26 and larceny is a
small, but important one.  With embezzlement, the offender comes into lawful
possession of the property and later misappropriates that property, whereas
with larceny, the offender takes the property unlawfully in the first instance.27
Further, the crime of embezzlement takes place in the context of the offender
having come into possession of the property by virtue of some employment,
trust, or agency, with the owner’s consent.28  Thus, the offender holds the prop-
erty in trust for the owner’s benefit but converts the property for his own use.29
Embezzlement is an “expansion of common-law larceny, made to prevent a
failure of justice that would occur under the technical rules that the law has
applied to larceny.”30  In other words, embezzlement was created to patch up
the loopholes that resulted from larceny’s failure to cover the situation of a
defendant forming the intent to convert the property after he had already come
into lawful possession of it because larceny requires a defendant to have
formed the intent at the time of the property’s conversion.31
The crime of “false pretenses”32 involves the offender making a material
misrepresentation to the owner or possessor of the property with the intent to
Attorney, Clark County, Nev., in Las Vegas, Nev. (Feb. 6, 2007).  Mr. Laurent’s interview is
discussed infra Part III.C.  See also Louisiana’s “purse snatching” statute, LA. REV. STAT.
ANN § 14:65.1 (2007), which includes larceny “from the person” and codifies it separately
from the common law theft crimes.
20 Grand larceny of a motor vehicle is codified at NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.228.




25 50 AM. JUR. 2D Larceny § 2 (2006).
26 Embezzlement is codified at NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.300 (2007).
27 Gerber & Foreman, supra note 13, at 97 (Under the common law, “the legal recipient of
property could not commit larceny because he had not taken and carried away property in
the possession of another.”); see also C.T. Foster, Annotation, Distinction Between Larceny
and Embezzlement, 146 A.L.R. 532 (1943) (discussing the distinction between larceny and
embezzlement).
28 Foster, supra note 27, at 543 (citing United States v. Harper, 33 F. 471 (C.C.S.D. Ohio
1887)).
29 Id.
30 Id. at 548 (citing State v. Collins, 61 N.W. 467 (N.D. 1895)).
31 See Gerber & Foreman, supra note 13, at 97 (“A new statutory offense of embezzlement
therefore was created in 1799 to punish this and the similar offenses labeled fraudulent
conversion, larceny by bailee, and larceny after trust.”).
32 False pretenses, known as fraud and fraudulent conveyances in Nevada, is codified at
NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.330 (2007).
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cheat the offender out of his property,33 leading the owner or possessor to vol-
untarily part with the property.34  The crime of false pretenses is distinguisha-
ble from larceny because the intent of the owner of the property, the victim,
governs.35  If the victim intends to keep title to the property but relinquish only
possession, the crime is larceny.36  However, if the victim intends to part with
both the title and possession, the crime is false pretenses.37  Additionally, the
crime of fraud is different from false pretenses because for a crime to constitute
fraud, the false pretense must actually cause the victim to rely upon the
offender’s false pretense to his detriment.38  Thus, under some fraud statutes,
and most notably Arizona’s,39 a false pretense is a key element of the crime of
fraud.40
Therefore, the only differences between the common law crimes of lar-
ceny, embezzlement, and false pretenses are at what time the offender formed
the intent to deprive the owner of the property permanently and, in the case of
false pretenses, what the victim had intended.41  Thus, new and innumerable
statutory crimes came into fruition as a means of covering those situations that
were not covered strictly by common law larceny—a means of plugging up the
loopholes found in larceny.42  These new statutory enactments, unfortunately,
created thin, technical distinctions among the common law crimes, making the
theft laws a confusing mess.43  Thus, seeing as how subtle and strikingly thin
these differences actually are, it is not surprising how easily crafty defense
attorneys finagle these differences to their clients’ advantage.
If the prosecutor charges the offender with larceny, for example, the
defense attorney can simply argue, “My client did not have the intent to steal
the property at the time he took the property; however he did form the intent a
little while later after having come into possession of the property.”  And,
unfortunately, the attorney’s argument would have succeeded under the com-
33 35 C.J.S. False Pretenses § 3 (1999).
34 Gerber & Foreman, supra note 13, at 97 (“The offense of obtaining property by false
pretenses also became a separate statutory crime following strict judicial enforcement of the
technical larceny requirement that property be obtained against the possessor’s will.”).




39 Arizona is notable because, again, its Comprehensive Theft Statute served as a model for
Nevada’s Comprehensive Theft Statute.
40 35 C.J.S. False Pretenses, supra note 33 (citing State v. Johnson, 880 P.2d 132 (Ariz.
1994)).
41 Id.
42 See Gerber & Foreman, supra note 13, at 98 n.249 (listing the Arizona statutes that the
legislature enacted in an “attempt to plug all the imaginable loopholes in the present theft
laws”); Paillette, supra note 13, at 530-31 (“The former Oregon false pretenses statute is
similar to those enacted in most other jurisdictions to plug the gap in common law larceny.”)
(footnote omitted)).
43 Gerber & Foreman, supra note 13, at 98 (stating that these technical distinctions are
nothing but “cumbersome”); Peterson, supra note 13, at 308 (noting that the proliferation of
the codified common law theft crimes is “puzzling, and the complexities it engenders can be
bewildering”); Scott, supra note 13, at 447 (observing that if England had extended larceny
to new situations, rather than enacting the newer crimes of embezzlement and false pre-
tenses, the theft laws would have been much simpler to comprehend).
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mon law, and, thus, the client would escape punishment, despite his being
undoubtedly guilty of one type of theft-related crime.  An actual real-life exam-
ple of this travesty will best drive this consequential point home.
A classic example of such an egregious result can be seen in a Colorado
Supreme Court case, Sparr v. People.44  In Sparr, the defendant was charged
with both embezzlement and obtaining property by false pretenses45 after he
had represented to a prospective buyer that he owned pinto beans that had actu-
ally belonged to his employer.46  The defendant sold a certificate that would
entitle the holder of the certificate to 100-pound sacks of pinto beans that were
in the warehouse of the defendant’s employer.47  After the admission of all
evidence, the prosecutor dismissed the count of false pretenses because he
decided the evidence better supported the count of embezzlement.48  The jury
ultimately convicted the defendant of embezzlement, and the defendant
appealed.49  The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the defendant’s conviction
because, in its view, the evidence presented did not support the theory of
embezzlement but rather false pretenses.50
One of the important elements of embezzlement, “conversion,”51 was
missing in Sparr because the defendant did not own the beans he was selling
via a certificate, and such certificate had no legal effect as to the ownership or
possession of any beans that his employer owned.52  The defendant did not
represent that he had such authority to sell in the scope of his employment
because he falsely represented that he was the one who owned the beans.53
Consequently, because the element of “conversion” was missing, the defendant
escaped conviction and punishment despite the fact that the evidence did ulti-
mately support the charge of false pretenses54:  a most unfortunate result, to say
the least.
Nevertheless, society does not, nor should it, tolerate such unfortunate
results, and it is this very intolerance by society that helped pave the way
towards the creation of Theft Statutes.
44 Sparr v. People, 219 P.2d. 317 (Colo. 1950); see also Scott, supra note 13, at 446 (citing
Sparr, 219 P.2d. 317).
45 Sparr, 219 P.2d at 318.
46 Id. at 319.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 318.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 321.
51 In order to convict for a criminal conversion, there must be established as an essential ele-
ment of the crime of embezzlement that there was an unauthorized assumption and exercise of
the right of ownership of goods and chattels belonging to another, to the alteration of their
condition or the exclusion of the owner’s right.
Id.
52 Id. at 320.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 321 (“Although defendant’s conduct, considered from the standpoint of the prose-
cution, would warrant conviction upon the second count of the information filed against him,
the offense of embezzlement is not supported by the evidence . . . .”).
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B. Rationales Behind the Creation of Theft Statutes
Upon first glance, it would appear that Theft Statutes do not really accom-
plish much because all they do is basically state that all of those crimes that are
known as theft-related crimes under the common law and/or have been codified
are defined under one statute.  Although it could be argued that Theft Statutes
are not a major revolution to the redefinition of the common law theft crimes,
they indeed are very important.55  Most importantly, these Theft Statutes are
extremely necessary if our goal is to ensure that criminals do not get away with
their crimes based on mere technicalities.56
Essentially four rationales exist behind the enactment of a CTS.  First,
Theft Statutes seek to simplify charging procedures for prosecutors by avoiding
the technical, procedural distinctions among the various common law theft
crimes, such as larceny, fraud, embezzlement, obtaining money by false pre-
tenses, and other similar offenses.57  These Theft Statutes accomplish this task
by dealing with all forms of common law theft in one simplified, comprehen-
sive statute,58 hence the name “comprehensive.”59  Therefore, rather than theft
crimes being classified regarding the means as to how the particular crime is
committed, the focus is shifted to the value of the property or services the
defendant has wrongfully obtained.60
Second, Theft Statutes prevent the egregious consequence of having
defendants escape punishment if a prosecutor has charged them with a particu-
lar theft-related crime that is later found unsupported by the evidence.61  In
other words, if the defendant is initially charged with larceny but the evidence
55 Rafael Guzman, 1976 Criminal Code—General Principles, 30 ARK. L. REV. 111, 111 n.1
(1976) (Guzman notes the significance of the revision of the theft crimes:  “Perhaps the most
noteworthy revision lies in the area of theft offenses where such traditional offenses as Lar-
ceny, Embezzlement, False Pretenses, etc. have been consolidated into a single offense of
Theft.”).
56 2 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 12, § 8.8(a)(2), at 412 (“It is thus apparent that to retain
these technical distinctions between the three crimes serves mainly to present a guilty defen-
dant with an opportunity to postpone and perhaps altogether to escape his proper
punishment.”).
57 Assemb. Comm. Hearing, supra note 7, at 4 (testimony of Carolyn Ellsworth, Chief Dep-
uty District Attorney for Clark County); see Hargrave, supra note 13, at 1109 (observing
that Louisiana’s Theft Statute eliminated the technical distinctions among the common law
theft crimes); see also Gerber & Foreman, supra note 13, at 98 (“The technical distinctions
among shoplifting, embezzlement, receiving stolen property, finding and keeping lost prop-
erty, defrauding an innkeeper, and other common law theft crimes should merge into an
overriding concept of unlawfully controlling the property or services of another.”).
58 Hargrave, supra note 13, at 1109 (“One of the major reforms of the Louisiana Criminal
Code was to consolidate the existing stealing offenses into one combined theft provision.”).
59 Assemb. 594, 1989 Leg., 65th Sess. (Nev. 1989) (“[a]dopts comprehensive theft statute”)
(emphasis added)); see JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 32.11, at 614-
15 (4th ed. 2006).
60 State v. Tramble, 695 P.2d 737, 740-41 (Ariz. 1985) (noting that the penalty for theft
depends on the value of the property or services obtained).
61 DRESSLER, supra note 59, at 615 (Thieves often escape punishment in the absence of a
Comprehensive Theft Statute “because the prosecutor is unable to prove beyond a reasonable
[doubt] whether the wrongdoer had a felonious intent at the time he took possession of
property (larceny) or later (embezzlement), or whether the wrongdoer’s admitted fraud
resulted in transfer of title (false pretenses) or only possession (larceny).”).
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is later found to support another theft-related crime, such as embezzlement or
obtaining money under false pretenses, then the defendant will go
unpunished.62
Third, these statutes ease the confusion surrounding the blurring of the
technical distinctions among the various, and originally separate and distinct,
common law theft crimes.63  The courts and state legislatures were the ones
responsible for the creation of these confounding, technical distinctions among
the various theft-related crimes because they, respectively, crafted the common
law crimes and then later codified them.64
The fourth rationale behind Theft Statutes is that they serve to “minimize
or eliminate extensive and costly state litigation”;65 however, this Note will not
delve further into this rationale for two reasons.  First, this rationale is beyond
the scope of this Note, and second, the legislative history of Nevada’s CTS
barely discusses it, only mentioning it without elaborating as to why.  Costly
and extensive state litigation can, and most likely will, be avoided by the enact-
ment of a CTS because “[t]his procedural simplification will contribute to
speedier justice, less crowded dockets, and fewer appeals.”66
Despite these consequential rationales, most notably the “simplification”
rationale, Nevada’s CTS fails to satisfy them because the CTS has added to, as
opposed to eliminated, the confusion of Nevada’s theft laws.
III. ANALYSIS OF NEVADA’S COMPREHENSIVE THEFT STATUTE
To comprehend the confusion surrounding Nevada’s CTS, it is imperative
to, first, examine the text of the CTS itself; second, consult Arizona’s CTS; and
finally, interview the people who testified in support of the enactment of
Nevada’s CTS, as well as the very people who actively utilize the theft laws
every day:  district attorneys for Clark County, Nevada.
A. Text of Nevada’s Comprehensive Theft Statute
Nevada’s CTS is codified as NRS 205.0833.  It provides in full:
1. Conduct denominated theft in NRS 205.0821 to 205.0835, inclusive, and section 1
of this act constitutes a single offense embracing the separate offenses commonly
known as larceny, receiving or possessing stolen property, embezzlement, obtaining
property by false pretenses, issuing a check without sufficient money or credit, and
other similar offenses.
62 2 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 12, § 8.8(a)(2), at 412; Michael B. Kennedy, Idaho’s
Generic Theft Law, 18 IDAHO L. REV. 43, 44 (1982) (noting that a travesty of justice occurs
“when a thief [is] permitted to escape justice because the chosen [common law] theory
turn[s] out to be incorrect”).
63 Bartram, supra note 13, at 250 (“[O]ver the past 130 years, court decisions and statutory
amendments have blurred the distinction among the theft offenses.”); Douglass, supra note
13, at 15-16 (noting that consolidating the common law theft crimes will “eliminate histori-
cal distinctions which serve only to confound prosecutors and complicate criminal
litigation”).
64 Bartram, supra note 13, at 250.
65 Assemb. Comm. Hearing, supra note 7, at 4 (testimony of Carolyn Ellsworth, Chief Dep-
uty District Attorney for Clark County).
66 Paillette, supra note 13, at 535.
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2. A criminal charge of theft may be supported by evidence that an act was commit-
ted in any manner that constitutes theft pursuant to NRS 205.0821 to 205.0835, inclu-
sive, and section 1 of this act notwithstanding the specification of a different manner
in the indictment or information, subject to the power of the court to ensure a fair
trial by granting a continuance or other appropriate relief if it determines that, in a
specific case, strict application of the provisions of this subsection would result in
prejudice to the defense by lack of fair notice or by surprise.67
Those specific actions that constitute “theft”—known in the common law
as larceny, receiving or possessing stolen property, and embezzlement, the
crimes that were originally codified in NRS 205.0821 to 205.083568—are
defined in the first part of NRS 205.0832.69
The second part of the CTS means that prosecutors may prosecute for
“theft” for any action that is deemed to be one of the codified common law
theft crimes—larceny, receiving or possessing stolen property, etc.  This means
that a prosecutor need not charge under the common law theft crimes but can,
and as will be argued extensively herein should, charge strictly under this one
simplified statute.
Although the body of the CTS provides that the crime of “theft” shall
encompass the common law theft crimes (larceny, receiving or possessing sto-
len property, embezzlement, obtaining property by false pretenses, issuing a
check without sufficient money or credit, and other similar offenses),70 these
common law theft crimes are still codified in Nevada’s statutes.71  Therefore,
the law of theft in Nevada is more muddled and, consequently, even more con-
fusing than it was prior to the adoption of the CTS.  The confusion can be
summed up with the following question:  if the sole purpose of a CTS is to
clarify the law that has become muddled over the years by replacing the com-
mon law theft crimes, why should the State refuse to repeal the very crimes that
the Comprehensive Theft Statute was meant to replace?
Because every state with a Comprehensive, Unified, or Consolidated Theft
Statute has repealed the common law theft crimes,72 it is especially enigmatic
67 NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.0833 (2007).
68 Id.
69 Id. § 205.0832(1)(a) (providing in relevant part that  “a person commits theft if, without
lawful authority, he knowingly . . . [c]ontrols any property of another person with the intent
to deprive that person of the property”).
70 Id. § 205.0833(1).
71 Larceny is codified at NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 205.2175 to .2707, embezzlement is codified
at NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 205.300 to .312, and fraudulent conveyances and fraud are codified at
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 205.330 to .460.
72 E.g., State v. Dunn, 767 So. 2d 405, 407 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000) (Alabama abolished the
common law crime of larceny and “created the new offense of theft of property” to take its
place.  “The purpose of the new theft statutes was ‘to create a unified theft offense which
eradicate[d] the common law distinctions between the crimes of larceny, embezzlement, and
false pretense.’” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)); State v. Lahurd, 632 So. 2d 1101,
1103 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (“The statute repealed the specific common law crimes of
larceny, embezzlement and obtaining money under false pretenses and substituted an
expanded and simplified crime of theft graded by degree according to the amount
involved.”); see also The Theft Act 1968, 33 J. CRIM. L. 63, 63 (1969) (“The Larceny Acts of
1861 and 1916 are among the enactments repealed.  The Act abolishes the old offenses of
larceny, embezzlement and fraudulent conversion and replaces them with a new offense of
theft.” (emphasis added)).
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\8-2\NVJ206.txt unknown Seq: 11  1-APR-08 12:59
682 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8:672
why the Nevada Legislature has chosen not to follow suit.  In an attempt to
ascertain why the Nevada Legislature has failed to repeal the common law theft
crimes at the time of the adoption of the CTS, or even afterwards, it is instruc-
tive and necessary to consult the history of Arizona’s CTS.
It is instructive, or more accurately crucial, to consult the history of Ari-
zona’s CTS because the Nevada Legislature utilized it as a model for the enact-
ment of Nevada’s CTS.  Arizona’s CTS, besides being the model for Nevada’s
CTS, is important to consult because the legislative history of Nevada’s CTS
provides no insight whatsoever as to why the common law theft crimes were
not repealed.
B. Arizona’s CTS
Arizona no longer has the common law theft crimes codified into its stat-
utes because the Arizona State Legislature repealed them at the time it enacted
its CTS.73  The reason for this, most likely, is because the common law theft
crimes codified in the statutes were no longer needed.  The very purpose behind
a CTS is to lump all of these crimes into one statute.  This makes a prosecutor’s
job much more efficient by enabling her to charge defendants under one simpli-
fied statute and, thus, avoiding the requirement that she choose at the outset of
a case under which common law theft crime to charge the defendant.  Further,
the one statute eliminates the “confusing distinctions between the various forms
of larceny [then] contained in Arizona statutes and case law.”74  Thus, the
Nevada Legislature’s desire to keep the common law theft crimes on the books
does not make any sense in light of the purpose behind the statute.
Additionally, the Nevada Legislature’s refusal to address this issue is per-
plexing because the legislative history of Nevada’s CTS unequivocally states
that Arizona’s CTS was consulted in the drafting of Nevada’s version of the
statute.75  Thus, Arizona’s CTS, including its language and the rationale behind
its enactment, was the main, and most likely the only, model consulted.76  And
yet, Nevada has failed to follow Arizona’s lead in repealing the common law
theft crimes, which Arizona did upon its enactment of its CTS.
An important distinction is that Arizona’s CTS, unlike Nevada’s, does not
refer to the names of the common law crimes that it is replacing.77  Arizona’s
CTS has practically identical wording to NRS 205.0832, which defines the spe-
cific acts that constitute “theft,” even though NRS 205.0832 is not Nevada’s
CTS.  Nevada’s CTS is NRS 205.0833, and it is this statute that refers to those
73 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1802 (2007).  Sections 13-661 through 13-777 were
repealed.  Those sections related to, e.g., degrees of theft, property subject to theft, theft of
money, and punishment.
74 Summary Analysis of New Criminal Code:  Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Judiciary,
1977 Leg., 33d Sess. 6 (Ariz. 1977).  Not surprisingly, this rationale is identical to the ratio-
nale stated in the legislative history of Nevada’s Comprehensive Theft Statute.
75 S. Comm. Hearing, supra note 10, at 3 (“Mr. Barker said the legislation was developed
from laws passed in the State of Arizona.”).
76 There is nothing in the legislative history to explain why Arizona’s Comprehensive Theft
Statute was consulted and not the Theft Statutes of other states.
77 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1802 (providing in relevant part that “[a] person commits
theft if, without lawful authority, the person knowingly . . . [c]ontrols property of another
with the intent to deprive the other person of such property”).
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other sections of the Nevada statutes that constitute the conduct that is now
defined as “theft” in the CTS, namely the codified common law theft crimes.78
To put it another way, Nevada essentially borrowed the language from
Arizona’s CTS and inserted it into a statute that is not the actual Theft Statute.
Furthermore, Nevada’s Theft Statute, unlike Arizona’s, does not list the penal-
ties for committing “theft” in the CTS itself.79  Instead, the penalties, which are
classified by the value of the property that a defendant misappropriated, are
provided in another, separate statute, namely NRS 205.0835.80  These seem-
ingly minor deviations from Arizona’s CTS are confusing, and they represent
further, and arguably conclusive, evidence that those who drafted Nevada’s
CTS did an inadequate, if not a downright poor, job.  It is such inadequate
drafting that further lends to the confusion surrounding Nevada’s theft laws.
Because Nevada’s CTS refers to the other statutory sections that define the
common law theft crimes,81 the Nevada Legislature perhaps did not intend to
repeal the common law crimes.
78 NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.0833 (2007) (“Conduct denominated theft in NRS 205.0821 to
205.0835, inclusive, and section 1 of this act constitutes a single offense embracing the
separate offenses commonly known as larceny, receiving or possessing stolen property,
embezzlement, obtaining property by false pretenses, issuing a check without sufficient
money or credit, and other similar offenses.”) (emphasis added)).
79 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1802(E) reads in relevant part:
Theft of property or services with a value of twenty-five thousand dollars or more is a class 2
felony.  Theft of property or services with a value of four thousand dollars or more but less than
twenty-five thousand dollars is a class 3 felony.  Theft of property or services with a value of
three thousand dollars or more but less than four thousand dollars is a class 4 felony, except that
theft of any vehicle engine or transmission is a class 4 felony regardless of value.  Theft of
property or services with a value of two thousand dollars or more but less than three thousand
dollars is a class 5 felony.  Theft of property or services with a value of one thousand dollars or
more but less than two thousand dollars is a class 6 felony.  Theft of any property or services
valued at less than one thousand dollars is a class 1 misdemeanor, unless the property is taken
from the person of another, is a firearm or is a dog taken for the purpose of dog fighting in
violation of § 13-2910.01, in which case the theft is a class 6 felony.
80 NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.0835 provides in full:
1. Unless a greater penalty is imposed by a specific statute and unless the provisions of section 1
of this act apply under the circumstances, a person who commits theft in violation of any provi-
sion of NRS 205.0821 to 205.0835, inclusive, and section 1 of this act shall be punished pursuant
to the provisions of this section.
2. If the value of the property or services involved in the theft is less than $250, the person who
committed the theft is guilty of a misdemeanor.
3. If the value of the property or services involved in the theft is $250 or more but less than
$2,500, the person who committed the theft is guilty of a category C felony and shall be pun-
ished as provided in NRS 193.130.
4. If the value of the property or services involved in the theft is $2,500 or more, the person who
committed the theft is guilty of a category B felony and shall be punished by imprisonment in the
state prison for a minimum term of not less than 1 year and a maximum term of not more than 10
years, and by a fine of not more than $10,000.
5. In addition to any other penalty, the court shall order the person who committed the theft to
pay restitution.
81 MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.1 cmt. 1, at 136 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980),
provides:
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Or, in the alternative, it is possible that the Nevada Legislature referred to
these other sections simply to define what is meant by “theft” and not because
it wanted prosecutors to continue to charge under those statutes after the enact-
ment of the CTS.  In sum, it is possible that this was strictly an oversight.
Unfortunately, the answer to this question can only be answered by the Nevada
Legislature, a question that is not very likely to be answered any time soon
because the Nevada Legislature seems to be comfortable with Nevada’s theft
laws.82  Perhaps the answer lies with the current prosecutors in Nevada and
those who testified in support of the enactment of Nevada’s CTS.
C. Interviews with Former Nevada District Attorney Carolyn Ellsworth and
Nevada District Attorneys Dave Barker, Christopher Laurent, and Ben
Graham
Because the legislative history of Nevada’s CTS is not instructive as to
why the common law theft crimes still exist in conjunction with the Theft Stat-
ute, the author of this Note interviewed those people who may offer some
insight as to why this is the case.  These interviewed individuals are/were pros-
ecutors, two of whom testified before the Nevada Legislature, and one of
whom, Clark County, Nevada, District Attorney Dave Barker, was responsible
for drafting the Theft Statute.
All of these individuals were asked the following questions in their respec-
tive interviews with the author of this Note:  (1) whether they feel the Nevada
Legislature has refused to address the issue of repealing the common law theft
crimes; and (2) whether prosecutors charge under either the common law theft
crimes or the Comprehensive Theft Statutes (in other words, whether they pick
and choose under which statutes to charge, depending on the particular facts of
the case).
1. Interview with Former Nevada District Attorney Carolyn Ellsworth
Carolyn Ellsworth, who testified before the Nevada Legislature83 as it
considered the adoption of a CTS, noted that she believes the Nevada Legisla-
ture failed to repeal the common law theft crimes upon enactment of the CTS
for three reasons.84  First, the Nevada Legislature, as well as Ms. Ellsworth,
wanted to make certain that the CTS was in place and “working ok” first.85
Second, she opined that it sounded better to call the accused, and have it pre-
It was specifically stated in the text of Subsection (1) as published in the Proposed Official Draft
of the Model Code, that the consolidated offense was designed to embrace the offenses that were
“heretofore known as larceny, embezzlement, false pretense, extortion, blackmail, fraudulent
conversion, receiving stolen property, and the like.” This language has been omitted so as not to
suggest that the common-law content of these offenses is meant to be carried forward.
(emphasis added).
82 Telephone Interview with Ben Graham, Dist. Attorney, Clark County, Nev., in Las
Vegas, Nev. (Feb. 13, 2007).
83 Assemb. Comm. Hearing, supra note 7, at 4 (testimony of Carolyn Ellsworth, Chief Dep-
uty District Attorney for Clark County).
84 Telephone Interview with Carolyn Ellsworth, former Chief Deputy Dist. Attorney, Clark
County, Nev., in Las Vegas, Nev. (Nov. 1, 2006).
85 Id.
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served in his record as, an “embezzler”86 as opposed to a “thief.”  Third, she
noted that everyone knows what the crime of embezzlement is as opposed to
the general crime of “theft.”87
However, most of her assessments do not seem to be particularly convinc-
ing, at least, not anymore.  First, regarding her concern about the statute “work-
ing ok,”88 this rationale may have made sense upon enactment.  If a statute is
newly enacted, it is important to ensure that it is serving the purpose for which
it was created; in this context, the main purpose was to make charging easier
for prosecutors.89  However, Nevada’s CTS was enacted in 1989, which was
well over nineteen years ago.90  There is no reason why the common law theft
crimes should still be on the books just in case the CTS does not work.  If the
prosecutors are unable to charge under the newer statute by now, why is that
statute still on the books?  Therefore, this reason does not really make sense in
light of the long passage of time since the CTS’s enactment.
Second, regarding her claim about labeling someone an “embezzler,” it is
doubtful that members of a jury care about the particular label with which the
defendant is identified.  It is the nature of the crime (the nature in this case
being theft of property) that ultimately matters.  Someone who is just a thief is
just as bad as someone who is an “embezzler.”91
Third, Ms. Ellsworth’s statement about everyone knowing what embezzle-
ment is92 constitutes a questionable answer.  The acts that constitute the crime
of embezzlement are muddled and, thus, difficult to comprehend.  This confu-
sion is one of the main rationales behind enacting a CTS in the first place.93
The distinctions among the common law theft crimes, which include embezzle-
ment, are slim and technical,94 and it is these technicalities that give rise to the
need for a CTS.  These statutes clarify the theft laws by lumping the common
law theft crimes together in one easy statute and calling it “theft,” which consti-
tutes a single offense.
2. Interview with Nevada District Attorney Dave Barker
Yet another person who testified before the Nevada Legislature, arguing
for the adoption of the Comprehensive Theft Statute, was District Attorney for




89 See supra Part II.B.
90 Assemb. 594, 1989 Leg., 65th Sess. (Nev. 1989) (“[a]dopts comprehensive theft statute”).
91 Scott, supra note 13, at 449 (“There is no difference in moral quality between the activi-
ties of a thief, an embezzler or a swindler.”); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.1 cmt.
2(b), at 132 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980) (“Prevailing moral standards do
not differentiate sharply between the swindler and other ‘thieves.’  To that extent, at least,
consolidation conforms to the common understanding of what is substantially the same kind
of undesirable conduct.”).
92 Telephone Interview with Carolyn Ellsworth, supra note 84.
93 See supra Part II.B.
94 Assemb. Comm. Hearing, supra note 7, at 4 (testimony of Carolyn Ellsworth, Chief Dep-
uty District Attorney for Clark County); see also Gerber & Foreman, supra note 13, at 98.
95 S. Comm. Hearing, supra note 10, at 3 (testimony of Dave Barker, District Attorney for
Clark County).
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state of the law of theft in Nevada is particularly crucial because he was one of
the people who participated in the drafting of Nevada’s CTS, in addition to
being one of the people who testified before the Nevada Legislature.
He answered in regard to the Nevada Legislature’s failing to address the
repeal issue by stating that he “would not characterize this situation as a
‘refusal.’  My impression is the time is so short with the 120-day rule and under
current rules BDRs96 are limited . . . so no one has asked.”97  Regarding the
question as to whether prosecutors charge under either the common law crimes
or the CTS depending on the facts of the particular case, he provided:  “We
don’t charge both . . . we use either,”98 “although the charging decision is based
more on an analysis of the facts and statutory elements than the name of the
crime.”99
It should be further noted that Mr. Barker did not respond to whether he
feels that the Nevada Legislature has failed to repeal the common law theft
crimes because of the doctrine of implied repeal.100  He said that he feels the
Nevada Legislature has failed to repeal the common law crimes because they
“did not have the political will to do so.”101
On this subject, he continued:  “On routine criminal cases where the facts
are clear, the old common law theories are OK.”102  Therefore, prosecutors
continue to charge under the common law theft crimes if there appears to be no
doubt what crime the accused has committed.103  From his answers, one may
reasonably infer that Mr. Barker feels that it is unnecessary to charge under the
CTS if there is virtually no doubt which common law theft crime the defendant
has committed.
His rationale seems to make sense upon initial inspection.  However, this
very same rationale is the exact opposite of what Mr. Barker argued in support
of the enactment of the CTS.  He testified before the Nevada Legislature that
one of the biggest problems with the then current theft laws in Nevada was that
96 The Nevada Legislature’s website explains that the Legislative Counsel Bureau is a ser-
vice agency that allows legislators to rely on the Bureau for assistance in the researching and
drafting of bills on their behalf instead of relying on biased people, such as lobbyists or the
governor to do so.  So, essentially, a BDR is a proposal for a new statute that is submitted to
the Legislative Counsel Bureau for drafting on behalf of the legislator. See Nevada Legisla-
ture, Legislative Counsel Bureau, http://www.leg.state.nv.us/lcb/morelcb.cfm (last visited
Mar. 3, 2007).
For more information on the procedures of submitting BDR’s, see Instructions for Sub-
mission of Bill Draft Requests by Executive Branch Agencies, available at http://budget.
state.nv.us/allagencymemos/memos2006/AAM2006_03_instructions.pdf (last visited Dec.
19, 2007).
97 E-mail Interview with Dave Barker, supra note 8 (ellipses in original).  Mr. Barker
explained that the 120 day rule means that the Legislature has 120 days to pass or otherwise
address a particular piece of legislation.  If the Legislature fails to do so within this time
period, the bill is rejected and will have to be re-submitted for later consideration.
98 Id. (ellipses in original).
99 Id.
100 See generally infra Part III.D.
101 Telephone Interview with Dave Barker, Dist. Attorney, Clark County, Nev., in Las
Vegas, Nev. (Nov. 6, 2006).
102 Id.
103 Id.
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prosecutors had to “‘pigeonhole’ or pick a particular charge, based upon
facts.”104  He continued:
The facts are extremely important . . . if there is a subtle distinction or change in
those facts, the crime can change . . . with this law, the prosecution need only charge
grand theft . . . then allege the facts behind the theft itself . . . it would not change the
burden of proof . . . but it would allow us to forego the need to make subtle distinc-
tions in the law.105
To recap, Mr. Barker stated in his email interview that “[o]n routine crimi-
nal cases where the facts are clear . . . the old common law theories are OK.”106
If this is what prosecutors are continuing to do—charging defendants under the
common law theories when it seems abundantly clear what crime they had
committed—then they are doing the exact thing that Mr. Barker argued was
wrong with the common law theories in his testimony before the Legislature.
Namely, they are picking particular theories based on the facts.107
This picking and choosing is troubling because although it may seem clear
the defendant has committed larceny, for example, at the charging stage, the
evidence may end up supporting another, uncharged common law theft crime,
like embezzlement.108  This means that if the evidence fits embezzlement as
opposed to the charged crime of larceny, the defendant will completely avoid
paying for his criminal behavior,109 despite his clearly being a thief.
Moreover, Mr. Barker’s explanation as to why the common law theories
still exist in the Nevada statutes does not make inherent sense.  Even if it seems
clear that the defendant committed larceny, it does not make sense that the
prosecutor refuses simply to charge him under the CTS.  This would be the
better course of action because if the evidence later points toward another com-
mon law theory, then the defendant’s charge under the CTS will take care of
this, demonstrating the utility of this statute.
3. Interview with Nevada District Attorney Christopher Laurent
Of course, Clark County District Attorney Christopher Laurent may
believe, as does Clark County District Attorney Dave Barker, that this picking
and choosing is harmless.  When the author of this Note asked Mr. Laurent
about whether Nevada prosecutors have ever encountered a problem where
they charged a defendant under one particular common law theory, like lar-
ceny, but the evidence later turned out to support a different theory, he sug-
gested this has never occurred.110  This question was then immediately
followed by an inquiry as to whether Nevada prosecutors have ever encoun-
tered problems regarding charging defendants under the common law theories
104 S. Comm. Hearing, supra note 10, at 3 (testimony of Dave Barker, District Attorney for
Clark County).
105 Id. (omissions in original).
106 E-mail Interview with Dave Barker, supra note 8 (ellipses in original).
107 S. Comm. Hearing, supra note 10, at 3 (testimony of Dave Barker, District Attorney for
Clark County).
108 See discussion regarding Sparr v. People, supra notes 44-54 and accompanying text; see
also 2 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 12, § 8.8(a)(2), at 412.
109 2 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 12, § 8.8(a)(2), at 412.
110 Telephone Interview with Christopher Laurent, supra note 19.
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as opposed to charging them strictly under the CTS.  He stated that it is a
concern on law enforcement’s initial screening, and he gave an example of a
police officer writing down “larceny” when the appropriate charge was actually
“embezzlement.”111  He then said in that particular situation, he would just
write down the charge of “embezzlement” instead of the charge of “lar-
ceny.”112  Besides this problem upon the initial screening of defendants, he did
not state that prosecutors have ever had problems with defendants escaping
punishment because the prosecutors charged them with the wrong common law
theft theory.
Despite the Nevada Legislature’s good intention to simplify charging pro-
cedures for prosecutors and to eliminate the technical distinctions among the
common law theft crimes, the CTS as currently applied is not being utilized
correctly.  Although the defendant’s crime may seem clear at the outset, the
factfinder—whether the factfinder be either a jury or a judge—may interpret
the evidence not to fit the particular crime for which the accused is charged.113
If this is the case, then the defendant will go free if he is charged for embezzle-
ment, for example, but the factfinder feels that the evidence does not fit the
embezzlement theory but fits some other common law theft crime.114
Perhaps the Nevada Legislature has not addressed repealing the common
law crimes because Nevada’s theft laws, in the shocking words of Mr. Laurent,
“are not confusing at all.”115  Mr. Barker, in contrast with Mr. Laurent, merely
implied this same sentiment, probably unintentionally, by opining that the
Nevada Legislature likely feels the issue is not important enough to address
thoroughly.
One may infer from both Mr. Laurent’s and Mr. Barker’s statements that
the explanation behind the Nevada Legislature’s failure to address the repeal
issue is due to the Legislature’s having come to the conclusion that Nevada’s
theft laws are clear as written, thus obviating the need for a change.  If this is
the true reason why the Nevada Legislature has failed to address the issue of
repealing the common law theft crimes, then this “explanation” just highlights
the Nevada Legislature’s ignorance regarding the purpose and rationales behind
Comprehensive Theft Statutes.  The Comprehensive Theft Statutes serve an
extremely crucial function:  they eliminate the technical, thin (in other words,
confusing) distinctions among the common law theft crimes.  These distinc-
tions arose from the courts’ attempts to cover the various situations that
amounted to theft but would not be considered theft under older theories.
However, in an attempt to prove that the theft laws are not confusing, Mr.
Laurent tried to explain why this is so by using an example of “larceny from
the person” and “larceny of livestock.”116  He stated that because “larceny from
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 2 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 12, § 8.8(a)(2), at 412 (“It is thus apparent that to retain
these technical distinctions between the three crimes serves mainly to present a guilty defen-
dant with an opportunity to postpone and perhaps altogether escape his proper
punishment.”).
114 Id.
115 Telephone Interview with Christopher Laurent, supra note 19.
116 Id.
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the person” involves an element of threat, it is not included in Nevada’s defini-
tion of common law larceny under the CTS.117  Regarding “larceny of live-
stock,” he said that because it is difficult to put a dollar amount on a stolen
cow, it is best to charge under the codified common law statute because unlike
the CTS, one does not need to put a dollar amount on the stolen property in
order to charge the defendant.118
These examples would provide some reasonable explanation as to why the
codified common law crime of larceny still exists except for one reason:  com-
mon law larceny, a crime that the Theft Statutes are meant to cover and replace,
includes both “larceny from the person”119 and “larceny of livestock.”120  Fur-
thermore, Arizona repealed all forms of common law larceny upon enactment
of its CTS.121  Because Arizona’s, as well as Nevada’s, CTS provides a defen-
dant’s penalty based upon the value of the misappropriated property,122 the
prosecutor still must determine the value of any misappropriated property,
including the value of livestock.  Moreover, as dictated by NRS 205.251, one
still must determine the value of all property involved in any larceny
offense.123  Thus, Mr. Laurent’s argument regarding the non-necessity of deter-
mining the value of livestock when charging under the codified common law
crime of larceny does not appear to be valid.  Furthermore, in his effort to
explain why Nevada’s theft laws are not confusing, he only served to prove that
Nevada’s theft laws are indeed perplexing.
4. Interview with Nevada District Attorney Ben Graham
Unlike Ms. Ellsworth, Mr. Barker, and Mr. Laurent, Clark County,
Nevada, District Attorney Ben Graham, whom Mr. Laurent referred to as a
“legislative guru,”124 stated directly that the Nevada Legislature has failed to
address the repealing of the common law theft crimes thoroughly because the
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 However, in Louisiana, “larceny from the person” is considered separate from the com-
mon law theft crimes because it includes an element of violence.  Thus, it is codified as
“purse snatching” under LA. REV. STAT. ANN § 14:65.1 (2007):
Purse snatching is the theft of anything of value contained within a purse or wallet at the time of
the theft, from the person of another or which is in the immediate control of another, by use of
force, intimidation, or by snatching, but not armed with a dangerous weapon.
120 52B C.J.S. Larceny, supra note 15 (“‘Larceny’ is a generic term within the broad out-
lines of which there are many different offenses.  These include petit larceny, grand larceny,
larceny from the person . . . .” (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted)); see also supra note 73
(providing a list of those common law theft crimes that were repealed upon enactment of
Arizona’s Comprehensive Theft Statute (this includes larceny of livestock)).
121 See supra Part III.B.
122 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1802(E) (2007) states in relevant part:  “Theft of property
or services with a value of twenty-five thousand dollars or more is a class 2 felony.” (empha-
sis added).
123 NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.251(2) (2007) provides in relevant part:  “The value of property
involved in larceny offenses committed by one or more persons pursuant to a scheme or
continuing course of conduct may be aggregated in determining the grade of the larceny
offenses.”
124 He dubbed Ben Graham “legislative guru” because Mr. Graham is the one in the District
Attorney’s office who is considered an expert on the Nevada Legislature’s activities.  Tele-
phone Interview with Christopher Laurent, supra note 19.
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Legislature is perfectly “comfortable with the situation.”125  The Legislature is
comfortable with the situation because it feels that there are no problems
regarding how the common law theft crimes are currently being read and uti-
lized.126  Further proof of the Nevada Legislature’s refusal to take the issue of
repealing the common law theft crimes seriously can be found in Nevada’s
burglary statute, NRS 205.060, and some of its legislative history.127  NRS
205.060 provides in relevant part:
A person who, by day or night, enters any house, room, apartment, tenement, shop,
warehouse, store, mill, barn, stable, outhouse or other building, tent, vessel, vehicle,
vehicle trailer, semitrailer or house trailer, airplane, glider, boat or railroad car, with
the intent to commit grand or petit larceny, assault or battery on any person or any
felony, or to obtain money or property by false pretenses, is guilty of burglary.128
As can clearly be seen, nowhere does the word “theft” appear in the stat-
ute.  Instead, the common law theft crimes of “larceny” and “false pretenses”
appear in the text.  As if this were not enough proof demonstrating the Nevada
Legislature’s failure to see the problem with using the common law theft terms
“larceny,” “embezzlement,” etc., the most recent piece of legislative history to
Nevada’s burglary statute is.
Sergeant David Della of the Reno Police Department testified before the
Nevada Legislature regarding the proposed amendment to the burglary statute
in 2005, an amendment that involved adding the “false pretenses” language into
the statute alongside the crimes “grand or petit larceny.”129  Mr. Della testified,
as well as drafted in his Bill Draft Request, that instead of adding “false pre-
tenses,” the words “any theft” should be added130 because “theft” is the lan-
guage used in Nevada’s Comprehensive Theft Statute and many of the
surrounding states’ statutes.131  He argued that “any theft” was enough and that
the “any theft” language would be “broader, and it would prevent having to
come back to this Committee in the future every time a new type of theft was
enacted.”132
Unfortunately, the amendment as proposed was passed in 2005, and the
word “theft” was not added to the statutory language.133  Although Sergeant
Della did not directly discuss the repeal of the common law theft crimes in light
of the CTS, his testimony and Bill Draft Request nonetheless brought the prob-
lem of using the common law terminology to the attention of the Nevada Legis-
125 Telephone Interview with Ben Graham, supra note 82.
126 Id.
127 NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.060; see May 11, 2005 Minutes:  Hearing on S.B. 449 Before the
Assemb. Comm. on Judiciary, 2005 Leg., 73rd Sess. 28 (Nev. 2005) [hereinafter May 11,
2005 Minutes] (testimony of Sergeant David Della, Reno Police Department, Reno, Nev.).
128 NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.060.
129 May 11, 2005 Minutes, supra note 127, at 28.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 27. (“Other states around us that are doing this are Colorado, Connecticut, Oregon,
and Washington.”).  The “this” referred to here is the practice of these states using the word
“theft” as opposed to larceny or obtaining money by false pretenses.
132 Id. at 28.
133 Id. at 29 (The proposed amendment that suggested adding “false pretenses” instead of
“theft” was passed (“The Motion Carried”) in response to Chairman Anderson’s asking:
“Do we want to broaden it or just take the bill as it’s currently written?”).
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lature.  It is a shame that the Nevada Legislature once again chose to ignore the
problem.  It is comforting, however, to see that at least some people, such as
Mr. Della and Mr. Graham, recognize the problem and see a need for change to
the confusing theft-of-property laws in Nevada.
District Attorney Ben Graham was the only one of the four district attor-
neys interviewed who at least implied that perhaps the state of the theft laws in
Nevada are in need of change.134  In fact, he went so far as to suggest that the
author of this Note submit an informal proposal to him in the Fall of 2008,
outlining changes that should be made to the theft-related crimes in Nevada, a
proposal that would be before the Nevada Legislature in 2009.135
D. The Doctrine of Implied Repeal:  Does It Repeal the Common Law
Theft Crimes?
Although the Nevada Legislature has failed to repeal the common law
theft crimes directly, they may be repealed by implication.  The doctrine of
implied repeal can occur in one of two ways.  First, if a statute appears to be
repugnant to the language of another similar statute and there is no reasonable
basis to read the statutes as being in harmony with one another, the older statute
is repealed by implication.136  Two statutes are out of harmony when the pur-
poses behind the statutes cannot both be realized because they are in direct
conflict with each other.137  The reason for this rule of statutory construction is
seemingly obvious.  By drafting and subsequently enacting a new statute that
covers the same exact subject matter, the legislature is essentially saying the
following:  this new statute is now the only law on this subject from this point
on.
Second, if the statute covers the whole subject matter of an earlier act and
it is clearly evident that it was intended as a substitute for it, repeal by implica-
tion occurs.138  Whether it is evident that the new law was meant to substitute
the old law is a question of legislative intent.  This means that “one statute will
not repeal another by implication unless it appears from the terms and provi-
sions of the later act that it was the intention of the legislature to enact a new
law in place of the old.”139  This is the relevant prong of the implied repeal
doctrine here.
134 Telephone Interview with Ben Graham, supra note 82.
135 Id.  However, it should be noted that even Christopher Laurent commented that maybe
the Theft Statute is in need of an “amendment.”  What exactly he meant by “amendment”
was unclear.  Telephone Interview with Christopher Laurent, supra note 19.
136 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 285 (2001).
137 Id.
If an act is so repugnant to, or so contradictory of, or so irreconcilably in conflict with, a
prior act that the two acts cannot be harmonized in order to effect the purpose of their enactment,
the later act operates without any repealing clause as a repeal of the first to the extent of the
irreconcilable inconsistency.
138 Red Rock v. Henry, 106 U.S. 596, 602 (1883); State v. Thompson, 511 P.2d 1043, 1045
(Nev. 1973) (citing State v. Economy, 130 P.2d 264 (Nev. 1942)); So. Nev. Tel. Co. v.
Christoffersen, 363 P.2d 96 (Nev. 1961); Cunningham v. Washoe County, 203 P.2d 611, 613
(Nev. 1949) (noting that the common law may be repealed by construction “in cases where a
statute has revised the whole subject”); 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes, supra note 136, § 280.
139 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes, supra note 136, § 280.
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In Nevada, the common law theft crimes are codified in two separate sec-
tions:  the statutes covering the particular common law theft crimes of larceny,
embezzlement, fraud, and obtaining money by false pretenses, and the CTS.
Because the newer CTS covers, or at least was intended to cover, the same
subject matter as the codified common law theft crimes, the codified common
law theft crimes may be repealed by implication.
Although it is feasible that the doctrine of implied repeal may serve to
repeal the common law theft crimes in light of the enactment of the CTS, there
are two reasons why the doctrine may not apply in this context.  First, the com-
mon law theft crimes and the CTS are not incongruous:  the crimes are just
defined in two separate places.  Second, courts disfavor repealing legislative
acts by implication and, thus, rarely do so.
Again, the CTS states in relevant part:  “Conduct denominated theft in
NRS 205.0821 to 205.0835, inclusive, and section 1 of this act constitutes a
single offense embracing the separate offenses commonly known as larceny,
receiving or possessing stolen property, embezzlement, obtaining property by
false pretenses, issuing a check without sufficient money or credit, and other
similar offenses.”140  Thus, the CTS is simply referring to those sections that
define what actions constitute the crime of “theft” under the newer CTS.  To
clarify, the newer statute is procedural in nature and not substantive:  it is pro-
cedural because it was enacted primarily to make charging defendants for the
crimes of theft easier for prosecutors, as indicated by the legislative history.141
Furthermore, the subject matter of the newer statute may not trump the
common law crimes because the CTS is merely a “technical adjustment [and]
. . . ‘a comprehensive uniform theft statute,’ that doesn’t change anything.”142
Again, it is quite reasonable to infer from this testimony that the CTS is not a
change or a complete replacement of the law regarding the common law theft
crimes.  If the law has not changed, then it may not be possible for the newer
statute to repeal by implication the older statutes that define the state and nature
of the theft crimes.
Additionally, courts disfavor repealing acts of the legislature by implica-
tion and will only do so if there is not any reasonable construction of both
statutes.143  In other words, both statutes are in harmony with one another if
140 NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.0833 (2007).
141 S. Comm. Hearing, supra note 10, at 3.  (Dave Barker, District Attorney for Clark
County, Nev. testified that the purpose behind a Comprehensive Theft Statute is to simplify
the charging process.); MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.1 cmt. 2(b), at 133 (Official Draft and
Revised Comments 1980) (“The purpose of consolidation . . . is not to avoid the need to
confront substantive difficulties in the definition of theft offenses.  The appropriate objective
is to avoid procedural problems.”).
142 June 12, 1989 Minutes: Hearing on Assemb. B. 594 Before the S. Comm. on Judiciary,
1989 Leg., 65th Sess. 16 (Nev. 1989) (testimony of Dr. James Austin, Director of Research,
National Council on Crime and Delinquency).
143 Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 273 (2003) (opinion of Scalia, J.) (“We have repeatedly
stated . . . that absent ‘a clearly expressed congressional intention,’ ‘repeals by implication
are not favored’ . . . .” (citation omitted)); Posadas v. Nat’l City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503
(1936) (“The cardinal rule is that repeals by implication are not favored.  Where there are
two acts upon the same subject, effect should be given to both if possible.”).
Further, the case of Red Rock v. Henry, 106 U.S. at 601-02, states:
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they can be read together.144  If the statutes are reconcilable, repeal by implica-
tion does not occur.145  Again, the CTS could be read in harmony with the
older, codified common law crimes.  The CTS does not exactly change theft
law jurisprudence, but instead it provides that the common law theft crimes
constitute the crime of “theft” and those crimes can be charged under that sin-
gle statute.
Thus, “theft” is just another word—a synonym—used to describe the
crimes of larceny, embezzlement, false pretenses, etc.  Because this is a reason-
able interpretation and courts strive to read two allegedly conflicting statutes as
being in harmony with one another,146 it is probable that the courts, whenever
they decide to address this doctrine in relation to Nevada’s CTS and the com-
mon law theft crimes, will refuse to repeal the common law theft statutes.
Moreover, courts will typically refuse to opine that an older law was
repealed by implication if it does not appear from the newer statute that the
legislature specifically intended a repeal of the older law, as the Nevada
Supreme Court articulated in Pyramid Land & Stock Co. v. Pierce.147  This
rule is rather ironic and surprising.  The purpose of the doctrine of repeal by
implication is to operate in those cases where the state legislature has either
refused or neglected to address the older law in the enactment of the newer law.
This is why the doctrine is referred to as an implied repeal:  repeal is not direct
from the legislature, but rather is an inference drawn from looking at the older
and newer laws to determine whether the newer law covers the same subject
matter as the older law.  If it covers the same subject matter, it can be inferred
that the legislature would choose to not keep the older law on the books.  Oth-
erwise, the legislature would not have passed the newer law.
Obviously, the only way to know definitively and unequivocally that the
legislature intended for the newer law to trump the older law is if the legislature
has specifically stated so either in the body of the newer statute or in the stat-
ute’s legislative history.  Thus, if the legislature has stated that the newer law is
a complete replacement of the older law in either the statute or the legislative
history, then this is a formal, direct repeal of the older law and, consequently,
applying the doctrine of implied repeal is moot.
[W]hen an affirmative statute contains no expression of a purpose to repeal a prior law, it does
not repeal it unless the two acts are in irreconcilable conflict, or unless the later statute covers the
whole ground occupied by the earlier and is clearly intended as a substitute for it, and the inten-
tion of the legislature to repeal must be clear and manifest.
See also Thompson, 511 P.2d at 1044-45 (citing Economy, 130 P.2d at 264).
144 Thompson, 511 P.2d at 1044-45 (citing Economy, 130 P.2d at 264).
145 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes, supra note 136, § 285, states:
Since laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation and with full knowledge of existing ones
on the same subject, it is reasonable to conclude that the legislature, in passing a statute, did not
intend to interfere with or abrogate any former law relating to the same matter unless the repug-
nancy between the two is irreconcilable.
(footnote omitted).
146 Id.
147 Pyramid Land & Stock Co. v. Pierce, 95 P. 210, 212 (Nev. 1908) (In reference to a 1903
act that contained no repealing clause and made no reference to the former act, the court
opined that “[r]epeals by implication are not favored, and there is nothing to suggest that any
repeal was intended.”).
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Of course, it is possible, if not probable, that the Nevada Supreme Court in
Pyramid Land could have meant by its statement “there is nothing to suggest
that any repeal was intended”148 that the Nevada Legislature’s intention regard-
ing a repeal cannot be ascertained by looking at the new statute, in this case the
CTS itself.  Thus, a direct, unequivocal statement from the legislature that a
repeal was intended is not necessary for there to be evidence of a suggestion
that the newer law was intended to repeal the older law.
This is most likely the meaning of this rule, but it is not a particularly
convincing interpretation.  The only way to infer accurately the true intention
of the legislature is by either examining the text of the statute itself to ascertain
its plain meaning or, in the case of ambiguity in the statutory language, by
examining the legislative history.149  Again, nowhere is it articulated in the
legislative history of Nevada’s CTS that the intention of the legislature was for
the CTS to repeal the common law crimes.  The history merely states that the
purpose behind the statute is to “eliminate technical distinctions”150 that exist
among the various common law crimes, simplify charging procedures for pros-
ecutors,151 eliminate the need for costly litigation,152 and prevent defendants
from walking free when it turns out that the crime with which they were ini-
tially charged does not fit the evidence.153
E. Solutions to Ending the Muddled Mess That Is Nevada’s Theft Laws
The only solution to ending the senseless confusion surrounding the theft-
related laws in Nevada is for the Nevada Legislature formally to repeal the
common law crimes the CTS was meant to replace.  However, this solution
alone is not enough to end the confusion.  Indeed, Nevada’s Comprehensive
Theft Statute is poorly drafted, especially in light of the fact that it was
modeled after Arizona’s much clearer CTS.  Nevada’s CTS should be amended
to include the penalties in the CTS itself as opposed to having them in a sepa-
148 Id.
149 City of Las Vegas v. Macchiaverna, 661 P.2d 879, 880 (Nev. 1983), provides in perti-
nent part:
The leading rule for the construction of statutes is to ascertain the intention of the legislature
in enacting the statute, and the intent, when ascertained, will prevail over the literal sense.  The
meaning of words used in a statute may be sought by examining the context and by considering
the reason or spirit of the law or the causes which induced the legislature to enact it.
(quoting Welfare Div. v. Washoe Co. Welfare Dep’t, 503 P.2d 457, 458-59 (Nev. 1972));
see also Cirac v. Lander County, 602 P.2d 1012, 1016 (Nev. 1979) (“If the words of a statute
are clear, we should not add to or alter them to accomplish a purpose not on the face of the
statute or apparent from permissible extrinsic aids such as legislative history or committee
reports.”).
150 Assemb. Comm. Hearing, supra note 7, at 4 (testimony of Carolyn Ellsworth, Chief
Deputy District Attorney for Clark County).
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 2 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 12, § 8.8(a)(2), at 412 (“It is thus apparent that to retain
these technical distinctions between the three crimes serves mainly to present a guilty defen-
dant with an opportunity to postpone and perhaps altogether to escape his proper
punishment.”).
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rate section.  This is what Arizona has done, and, consequently,154 Arizona’s
CTS is much easier to comprehend.
Another worthwhile suggestion is for the Nevada Legislature to amend the
CTS to define only those acts that constitute the crime of “theft.”  It is true that
NRS 205.0832 already defines the acts that constitute “theft.”155  However, the
CTS, NRS 205.0833, refers specifically to the common law crimes that the
CTS is meant to replace.156  This creates the impression that the acts that con-
stitute “theft” are different and separate from the common law crimes.  This
interpretation is not difficult to fathom, considering that the acts that constitute
“theft” are listed in a separate statute—NRS 205.0832—when in actuality those
acts that constitute “theft” include the common law crimes that are specifically
named in NRS 205.0833.
Put another way, the Nevada Legislature should list those acts that consti-
tute theft in NRS 205.0833, the CTS, instead of listing those acts in a com-
pletely separate statute.  This would eliminate any possible confusion regarding
which of the “acts that constitute theft” constitute the common law theft crimes
of larceny, embezzlement, false pretenses, etc.  In the alternative, Nevada, like
Arizona, could eliminate from the statutory language of the CTS the common
law theft crimes.157  This elimination would prevent confusion as to whether
the codified common law theft crimes still exist.  If there is no mention of the
common law theft crimes in the statute, then it is conclusively established that
the acts that once constituted these common law crimes are now known as
simply “theft,” thus eliminating any confusion.
Or better yet, a complete redrafting of the CTS would be advisable, with
the following proposed definition of “theft”:  “the misappropriation or taking of
anything of value which belongs to another, either without the consent of the
other . . . , or by means of fraudulent conduct, practices, or representations.”158
Not only is this language simple, but it allows for the addition of new crimes
that are similar to theft, thereby eliminating the need for the Nevada Legislature
to keep enacting new statutes whenever a new crime is delineated as “theft.”
Lastly, if the Nevada Legislature is not going to address this problem, then
perhaps the courts should intervene and declare that the older, common law
crimes are repealed by implication.  However, this solution is not likely to be
realized any time soon, if ever.  The courts dislike opining that older statutes
are repealed by implication because to do so is overstepping the bounds of what
154 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1802 (2007).
155 NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.0832 (2007) (title of statute is “[a]ctions which constitute theft”).
156 NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.0833 provides in relevant part:  “Conduct denominated theft . . .
constitutes a single offense embracing the separate offenses commonly known as larceny,
receiving or possessing stolen property, embezzlement, obtaining property by false pre-
tenses, issuing a check without sufficient money or credit, and other similar offenses.”
157 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1802 (The language of Arizona’s Comprehensive Theft
Statute makes no mention of the common law theft crimes; it simply lists those acts that
constitute the crime of “theft.”).
158 Hargrave, supra note 13, at 1109 (quoting article 67 of Louisiana’s Criminal Code of
1942).  “There seems to be absolutely no reason why today the fundamental notion that it is
socially wrong to take the property of another, in any fashion whatsoever, cannot be stated as
clearly as it has been above.” Id. (quoting the comment to article 67 of the Louisiana Crimi-
nal Code of 1942).
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is within the purview of the judiciary and intrudes on the province of the legis-
lature:  repealing statutes constitutes lawmaking, and lawmaking is within the
purview of the Legislature.159  Thus, for obvious reasons, courts will strive to
interpret seemingly conflicting statutes as being in harmony with one another in
order to avoid the appearance of lawmaking.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Nevada Legislature must repeal all of the codified common law theft
crimes to eliminate the confusion surrounding the Nevada Legislature’s adop-
tion of the CTS, the purpose of which is to extinguish the technical distinctions
among the common law crimes.  Because all other states that have Theft Stat-
utes, most importantly Arizona, have repealed the common law theft crimes,
Nevada would be wise to follow suit.
The author’s interviews with District Attorneys Ms. Ellsworth and Messrs.
Barker, Laurent, and Graham helped explain why the common law crimes were
not repealed upon the CTS’s enactment.  However, the information gleaned
from those interviewed did not explain why prosecutors continue to pick and
choose which common law theft theories to charge defendants with, despite this
being the main rationale behind the CTS’s enactment.
This picking and choosing has proven to be detrimental when the evidence
turns out to favor another common law theft crime.  Unfortunately, because
prosecutors are still charging under either the common law or the CTS, they are
still picking and choosing between the common law theories.  It is precisely
this picking and choosing that illuminates the problem with the common law,
which led to the creation and enactment of the CTS in the first place.
The older crimes may still exist because it was inadvertent.160  This infer-
ence would be more plausible if the CTS were new, but it is not:  it was enacted
in 1989.  Moreover, such an inference is unreasonable because prosecutors con-
tinue to charge under the common law.  However, the common law crimes may
nonetheless be repealed by the doctrine of implied repeal because the CTS
encompasses the same subject matter as the common law crimes, although this
is unlikely because courts are reluctant to repeal statutes by implication.
The Nevada Legislature must formally address the repeal issue if the con-
fusion is to end.  The best course of action is for the Nevada Legislature to
159 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.18 (Congress shall “make all Laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by
this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof.”); NEV. CONST. art. IV, §§ 23, 35; 1A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 23:10, at 492-93 (6th ed. 2002) (“The underlying theory in modern gov-
ernment is that it is through the legislatures and Congress that the current public demands
resulting from changing social, economic and political conditions are enabled to find
expression.”).
160 See Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 281 n.5 (1981) (Stewart J., dissenting) (observing that
although it may be unreasonable to expect Congress to alter fundamental policy by repealing
an older statute upon enactment of the newer one without an unambiguous intent to do so, it
may be “equally unreasonable to expect Congress to specify, or indeed even to consider, the
effect of a new statutory provision on all earlier provisions affecting the same subject that
may be swept away by the enactment” (emphasis added)).
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repeal the common law crimes in order to uphold the spirit behind the creation
and enactment of the CTS.  It should also either redact the statutory language
mentioning the common law theft crimes or redraft the CTS altogether.
